In Brief
The appellant, an advocate, lived adjacent to the respondent and filed suit in 2004 seeking an injunction to stop flour mill operations causing vibrations, air and noise pollution. The trial and first appellate courts granted perpetual injunction, but the High Court set it aside on the ground that the suit was time-barred because the mill started in 1990 (outside the 3-year limitation period), even though operations with diesel generator causing nuisance began only in 2003. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, holding that the cause of action arose in 2003 (when the diesel generator was installed), making the 2004 suit timely. The Court also noted that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law, improperly entertained for the first time in second appeal, and recognized the continuing nature of the nuisance. The original decree of perpetual injunction was restored.
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