Delhi High Court to Determine if Attorney General’s Refusal of Contempt Consent is Subject to Judicial Review

NEW DELHI — The Delhi High Court has issued notice in a petition that challenges a fundamental "gatekeeping" power of the Union’s top law officer. The court is set to examine whether the Attorney General for India (AG), while exercising statutory power under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is immune to judicial review when refusing to initiate criminal contempt proceedings.

Factual Matrix
The petitioner, Venkatesh S., appeared in person to challenge a November 2023 order passed by the Attorney General, R. Venkataramani. The AG had declined to grant consent to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against the authors and publishers of a 2019 article titled "How Has the Supreme Court Fared During the Modi Years?"

The petitioner contended that the article, which characterized the judiciary as “timid” and “vulnerable,” scandalized the authority of the Supreme Court and lowered its dignity in the eyes of the public. He argued that the AG's refusal to act against such "contumacious" remarks was erroneous and required judicial intervention.

The Attorney General’s Reasoning
In the impugned order, the Attorney General maintained that the article in question fell within the protective ambit of Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a). The AG observed that:

• Contempt jurisdiction is a "drastic power" that should be invoked only in clear cases of willful and deliberate conduct intended to obstruct justice.
• The article presented a specific perspective on the executive-judicial relationship, which does not necessarily constitute "criminal contempt."
• The threshold for scandalizing the court must be balanced against the democratic right to critique institutions.

Legal Question and Procedural History
When the matter came before Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, the court noted a significant legal vacuum regarding the finality of the AG’s discretion. Under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the consent of the AG or the Solicitor General is a mandatory prerequisite for any private individual to file a criminal contempt petition in the Supreme Court.

The High Court observed that there are currently divergent opinions among various High Courts across the country regarding the maintainability of such writ petitions. While some jurisdictions view the AG’s decision as an administrative act subject to review, others view it as a quasi-judicial or discretionary function that the courts should not interfere with.

Ratio and Future Implications
The Delhi High Court has now formulated two primary points for consideration:

1. Can the AG’s opinion be reviewed under Article 226 (Writ Jurisdiction)?
2. Did the specific article in question meet the legal threshold for criminal contempt?

This case carries significant weight for the legal fraternity, as it touches upon the balance between the independence of the judiciary and the fundamental right to free speech. If the court rules that the AG’s refusal is reviewable, it could open a new avenue for litigants to challenge the "veto" power of law officers in contempt matters.

The matter is scheduled for further hearing on September 29, 2026.

Discription: The Delhi High Court is currently deliberating a pivotal constitutional question: is the Attorney General’s (AG) refusal to permit criminal contempt proceedings absolute, or is it subject to judicial review? Under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the AG acts as a statutory gatekeeper, ensuring that only meritorious cases of "scandalizing the court" reach the bench.

The petitioner challenges the AG’s decision to shield an article critical of the Supreme Court, arguing the refusal was an error of law. While the AG maintains that the article constitutes protected Free Speech, the High Court must now resolve conflicting judicial precedents. This ruling will determine if the AG’s "veto" is an administrative act challengeable under Article 226, or a protected discretionary power, fundamentally impacting the balance between judicial dignity and public critique.