No bar on a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., such petition would not be maintainable if grounds for relief were available at the first instance: SC



Share on:

On October 30, 2023, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court (SC) comprising of Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Kumar was hearing the Bhisham Lal Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh case. The SC observed that there is no bar on a second petition under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), 1973 and such a petition would not be maintainable in case the grounds for relief were available at the first instance itself to the party. The bench further ordered that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the grounds that were available for the challenge even at the time of filing of the first petition would not be maintainable. 

In this context, Justice Kumar noted in its judgment, “Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefore arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted.” 

The SC was hearing the matter against the Allahabad High Court order that dismissed the appellant’s second Section 482 application. While hearing the matter, the SC bench considered its existing judgments and highlighted that “the second petition was not maintainable, as the High Court did not have the power to upset the order dated 28.01.1995 which had attained finality.” After hearing the contentions, the bench concluded, “In the case on hand, the filing of the charge sheet and the cognizance thereof by the Court concerned were well before the filing of the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., wherein challenge was made only to the sanction order. That being so, the petitioner was not at liberty to again invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the charge sheet and the cognizance order at a later point of time. The impugned order passed by the Allahabad High Court holding to this effect is, therefore, incontrovertible on all counts and does not warrant interference.”