On October 8, 2025, the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (SC) of India rejected the request of the Union government for victim- and society-centric guidelines for sentencing in gruesome crimes, including a request to review the court’s 2014 Shatrughan Chauhan guidelines that regulate the consideration of mercy petitions and executions of death sentences. While hearing the matter, the bench consisting of Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta, and Justice NV Anjaria ruled that the request was “meritless.” It said, “We do not find any merit in this MA (miscellaneous application).”
The Centre's modification petition, submitted in 2020, had asked the court to shift the focus from what it deemed an "accused-centric" regime to one that placed greater emphasis on victims and society. The modification sought changes such as a fixed time window for filing of curative petitions, a requirement to file a mercy petition within seven days of the issuance of a death warrant, and a direction that executions take place within seven days of the rejection of a mercy petition (basically seeking to eliminate the notice period then accepted by the Court). The government utilized the delay concerning the 2012 Nirbhaya convicts to provide support for its application. Further, the application also stated, “The guidelines are accused-centric. These guidelines, however, do not take into account an irreparable mental trauma, agony, upheaval and derangement of the victims and their family members, the collective conscience of the nation and the deterrent effect which the capital punishment intends to make.”
The SC bench stressed that the protection of mercy-petition prolongation referenced in Shatrughan Chauhan vs. Union of India (2014), which states that if petition prolongation of pendency is excessive, it may warrant commutation, and which requires 14 days after informing the condemned about the rejection of their mercy petition before executing the sentence, will remain binding. The court declined to reduce those protections, indicating the hesitation of the judiciary to reduce procedural intervals that protect fundamental rights and allow due process. The order effectively maintains the death penalty procedure unchanged and establishes that any recalibration between victims' interests and convicts' procedural rights will occur through legislation, rather than through the judicial alteration of established precedent. Legal observers indicate that the judgment reaffirms the Court's reticent nature in changing capital-punishment assurances that were created to protect constitutional guarantees.